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Metaphors in Cognitive Linguistics 
Attila Imre 
The first part of the article offers an historical overview of 
metaphors, starting from Aristotle and the classical definition of 
metaphor. Chomsky's contribution to cognitive psychology is also 
mentioned together with Rosch’s and Kay and McDaniel’s research 
concerning categorization. The end of the first part contains new 
theories of metaphor, thus establishing the link to the second part, 
which presents the last three decades regarding metaphors in 
cognitive linguistics, trying to highlight the revival of studies on 
metaphor. The pervasiveness of metaphors cannot be overlooked in 
human understanding, and the classical debate is also mentioned 
(dead versus live metaphors). Our conclusion is that they offer an 
insight into our everyday experience and may help us in exploring 
the unknown. 
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Historical Overview 
As metaphor has been the subject of various inquiries throughout the centuries, 
we start by presenting the major thoughts connected to it. The nature of 
metaphor has been an ardent subject of debate back to Aristotle, who discussed 
it on the level of noun (name), stating that metaphor typically ‘happens’ to the 
noun, and it is presented as motion: 
…the application of a strange (alien, allotrios) term either transferred 
(displaced, epiphora) from the genus and applied to the species or from 
the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another, or 
else by analogy (1982:1447b). 
After a name is applied to an alien thing, it may express something much more 
clearly, which is otherwise difficult to grasp. Aristotle’s four possibilities of 
creating a metaphor are: genus to species, species to genus, species to species, 
and by analogy or proportion; resemblance is explicitly mentioned. However, in 
what was probably his later work one can find that the major goal of rhetorical 
speech is persuasion, which is of less importance from our point of view. 
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Nevertheless, the virtues of metaphor include clarity, warmth, facility, 
appropriateness and elegance, and finally “metaphor sets the scene before our 
eyes” (Aristotle 1954:1410b). 
Scholars argued that even the definition of metaphor is itself metaphorical, 
so the explanation for metaphor is thus circular. For instance, Derrida (1982) 
realized that any explanation relies heavily on the physical – and in this way on 
the metaphorical –, as our thinking is basically metaphorical; this led to the 
conclusion that metaphors could be only explained based on other metaphors. 
Researchers might have slowed down with their interest in metaphors 
throughout the centuries, leaving them to thrive ‘only’ in stylistics, as a basic 
‘figure of speech’, a trope, trimming ordinary language, taking away 
monotonousness by ‘picturesque’ replacements. Aristotle’s Rhetoric encouraged 
this approach, and things stayed more or less undisturbed until the twentieth 
century, when Chomsky directed back the attention of many to linguistics. In his 
Language and Mind, he states that linguistics is a branch of cognitive 
psychology: 
I think there is more of a healthy ferment in cognitive psychology – 
and in the particular branch of cognitive psychology known as 
linguistics – than there has been for many years…if we are ever to 
understand how language is used or acquired, then we must abstract for 
separate and independent study a cognitive system, a system of 
knowledge and belief (1972:1-4). 
Chomsky admits that “we are as far today as Descartes was three centuries ago 
from understanding just what enables a human to speak in a way that is 
innovative, free from stimulus control, and also appropriate and coherent” 
(1972:12-13), and he turned to the analysis of deep structure. Instead of deep 
structure and transformations, cognitive linguistics focuses on language in terms 
of the concepts, and it is interested in meaning and the uncovering of a network 
with interconnected elements, which may offer explanation about the nature of 
metaphor. It is to the merit of cognitive linguistics to have the idea of including 
metaphor within natural language widely accepted, thus pioneering a way of 
understanding metaphors by tracing their roots back to ordinary, concrete words, 
reinterpreting resemblance, and explaining the need for metaphors, which were 
constituents only in stylistics. 
The Saussurean classification must have had its merit, whatever nature this 
classification was, as the idea re-emerged towards the end of the century. 
Brugman highlights the importance of categories (another type of classification), 
based on Rosch (1977) and Kay and McDaniel (1978), reaching the verdict: 
sensory elements in categorising human experience represent a possibility to 
describe language, although a single word is but a narrow investigation, not 
revealing great truths about the language itself (1981:1). 
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Still, by analyzing metaphors, it became obvious that they are grounded in 
our everyday physical experience and they are not as close to similes as was 
rooted in the western tradition (‘Metaphor is an abbreviated simile’). Instead, 
cultural stereotypes should be accounted for when metaphors are investigated, 
for instance, metaphors with snow in Eskimo trigger different associations than 
in any African language (cf. Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and more recently, the neo-
Whorfian hypothesis). On the other hand, diachronically viewed, metaphors 
dating decades or centuries ago might have changed as well, and similarities that 
were important or easily observed may be forgotten. 
The ‘seeing as’ becomes problematic within cognitive linguistics, as 
metaphors usually try to shake category boundaries, and this friction cools with 
continuous usage. Black (1962) took into parts the constituents of metaphors, 
stating that only the common elements would select each other and ‘reconcile’. 
This comes close to Rosch’s prototype theory of semantic features, where we 
have marginal members instead of tension, or we can also mention Mac 
Cormac’s fuzzy set theory (1985). 
Whereas concrete categories are much better defined and relatively well-
separated from others (although boundaries are flexible and they often depend 
on the point of view, as members have various characteristics), the abstract 
entities are often made more explicit via metaphors, which make use of the 
concrete categories (cf. Aristotle). Consequently, metaphors do not describe 
reality, but they create one where strange elements intermingle with more 
familiar ones, thus revealing a part of how we see our surrounding world and 
ourselves. 
Langacker (1999:208) states that we are able to conceive of one situation 
against the background afforded of another. Regarding new information, 
previous discourse functions as a background to the current expression, and 
when speaking of metaphors, the source domain serves as a background for 
structuring and understanding the target domain. More recently, there are studies 
in which the theories of metaphor are undermined by theories of metonymy. 
According to Barcelona (2003) and Taylor (2003), metonymy is an operation 
that may be more fundamental to the human conceptual system than metaphor. 
Barcelona (2003:31) even suggests that ‘every metaphorical mapping 
presupposes a prior metonymic mapping.’ The so-called primary metaphors are 
argued to be motivated by experiential correlation (Evans and Green, 2006:320), 
but correlation is basically metonymic (Taylor 2003). 
We could see that an historical account of metaphors already encapsulates a 
cognitive interpretation as well, as the past three decades contributed 
significantly to present-day approach to metaphors. Now let us examine recent 
interpretations. 
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Metaphors Reloaded 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) may be considered the first passionate 
supporters of metaphors, as in their view metaphors are conceptual, as many of 
the ways in which we think and act are basically metaphorical (Evans and 
Green, 2006:44). Descartes’ rationalist approach is evident in formal 
approaches, such as Chomsky’s generative grammar or Montague’s framework, 
according to which language can be studied as a formal or computational 
system, irrespective of human experience or the nature of the human bodies. The 
Lakoffian (empiricist) concept is based on the importance of human experience, 
the centrality of the human body without which the human mind and language 
“cannot be investigated in isolation from human embodiment” (Evans and Green 
2006:44). 
According to Moran (1997), issues regarding metaphor in poetics, rhetoric, 
aesthetics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and cognitive studies cannot be 
wholly isolated from each other. So far we have tried to present metaphors 
starting from their beginnings, and we have to accept that the sparkle to recent 
studies on metaphor belongs to Brugman, who based her work on Rosch’s 
findings. Ever since cognitive linguists have been arguing that metaphor is 
central to human language (cf. Evans and Green 2006). The basic idea is that 
metaphors (metaphorical expressions) are based on our physical experience, and 
offer a background to the analysis of metaphors in a synchronic frame. The 
comprehension of figurative language is dependent on the literal understanding 
of the words used, unlike in the case of idiomatic expressions: 
Literal language is precise and lucid, figurative language is imprecise, 
and is largely the domain of poets and novelists. While literal language 
is the conventional ‘ordinary’ or ‘everyday’ way we have of talking 
about things, figurative language is ‘exotic’ or ‘literary’ and only need 
concern creative writers  (Moran 1997:249). 
According to this view, most ordinary language is literal. However, on a closer 
inspection, much of our ordinary everyday language turns out to be figurative in 
nature (Evans and Green 2006:287). Gibbs contradicts this ancient distinction 
(1994:75), as he differentiates conventional literality, non-metaphorical 
literality, truth condition literality and context-free literality. He also adds that 
certain concepts are impossible to describe non-metaphorically; for instance, 
time without recourse to space and motion is hard to describe. 
We will not enter another debate regarding the differences between 
metaphors and iconicity, but it may be interesting to mention Gentner and 
Bowdle's experiment (2001) presented by Hasson and Giora (2007). They 
studied the differences between metaphors and similes (cf. Johnson’s 1996 
research: comprehension times for metaphors and similes), and concluded that 
when the sources are novel, similes can be more quickly understood than 
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metaphors, but when we face conventionalized sources, the comprehension of 
metaphors is quicker. These findings are completed by Kövecses’s preface 
(2002) where the author contradicts five traditional concepts regarding 
metaphor, e.g. one must have a special talent to be able to use metaphors; in fact, 
they are used effortlessly in everyday life by ordinary people, as they are an 
inevitable process of human thought and reasoning. 
More recently, Gibbs (2007:16) discusses metaphoric understanding based 
on research conducted in 2006 by Wilson and Gibbs, and his conclusion is that 
“people were faster in responding to the metaphor phrases having performed a 
relevant body moment than when they did not move at all”. Another finding was 
that “real movement is not required to facilitate metaphor comprehension, only 
that people mentally simulate such action”, as generally speaking, people do not 
understand the non-literal meanings of metaphorical expressions as a matter of 
convention. 
Kövecses’s forerunners, Lakoff and Johnson, also mention persistent 
fallacies (1980:244-245), stating that metaphor is a matter of words not concepts; 
but the locus of metaphor is in concepts not words. Moran states (1997:251) that 
in metaphor we interpret an utterance as meaning something different from what 
the words would mean, if we took them literally. This means, that the same 
words or utterances change their meaning when taken metaphorically (Moran 
1997:251). 
Metaphors transport the images, feelings, values, thought patterns, etc. en-
trenched in our cultures, as Mittelberg (2007:34) states based on Dirven, Wolf, 
Poltzenhagen; Kövecses (2005) also accepts this view. Furthermore, metaphor is 
based on similarity; but it is based on cross-domain correlations in our experience, 
which give rise to the perceived similarities between the two domains within the 
metaphor. These two domains lead to the many interpretations outlined below; we 
would only like to mention here Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor, which is based on 
icons (standing for something) concerning cognitive notions, and he adopts 
Wittgenstein’s proposal (1958), namely “seeing as” (mentioned by Mac Cormac). 
Lakoff and Johnson also say that all concepts are literal and none can be 
metaphorical; but even our deepest concepts (time) are understood and reasoned 
about via multiple metaphors, so they conclude that, in short, metaphor is a natural 
phenomenon (1980:247). 
According to Coulson (2007), many empirical studies have compared 
reading times for literal and non-literal utterances, and found that when the 
metaphorical meaning was contextually supported, reading times were roughly 
similar. Gibbs (1994) notes, parity in reading times need not entail parity in the 
underlying comprehension processes, and he also mentions that literal and 
metaphorical meaning might take the same amount of time to comprehend, but 
that the latter required more effort or processing resources. 
On the other hand, classical accounts of metaphor comprehension (cf. Grice 
1975 or Searle 1979) describe a two-stage model, in which literal processing is 
followed by metaphorical processing. The real support in favour of Lakoff and 
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Johnson regarding their theory about the central importance of metaphors comes 
from Pynte and colleagues, who could not find qualitative differences in brain 
activity associated with the comprehension of literal and metaphoric language 
(Coulson 2007:414), which is consistent with Gibbs (1994) or Glucksberg 
(1998). 
The pervasiveness of metaphors in human understanding can be best 
characterized by the phenomenon whereby a target domain is structured and 
understood with reference to another (more basic) source domain (cf. ‘[P]hysical 
experience shapes our understanding’). Here we seem to reiterate the idea that 
physical experience is central, though we cannot say that it is more basic than 
other (emotions or time), although at a given point Langacker (1999) considers 
that time is more important than space, as the former is needed to perceive 
changes in the latter (motion). Anyway, a reasonable conclusion would be that 
the source domain serves as the background for structuring and understanding 
the target domain (Langacker 1999:208). At this point we can mention W. 
Bedell Stanford’s summary on metaphors: 
The essence of metaphor is that a word undergoes a change or 
extension of meaning. In simile nothing of this kind occurs; every 
word has its normal meaning and no semantic transference is incurred 
(cited by Mac Cormac 1985:37).  
To Lakoff and Johnson, the essence of metaphor is understanding and 
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another, and we act according to the 
way we conceive of things (1980:5). The problem is that one can easily 
remember those school days when the difference between metaphors and similes 
were explained with a set of examples: 
 
Her cheeks are like red roses. (simile) 
Her rosy cheeks … (metaphor) 
The explanation was that metaphor is a shortened or compressed simile, without 
the like element; we now know, that this is not as simple as it may seem, as the 
only similarities relevant to metaphor are the ones experienced by people, which 
differs based on culture and personal previous experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 
1980:154), and metaphors force us to wonder, compare, note similarities and 
dissimilarities, and then seek confirmation or lack of confirmation regarding the 
suggestions posed by metaphors (Marconi, 1997:76). Mac Cormac completes the 
picture about metaphors by stating that resemblance and difference are also 
constituents when metaphor is at stake, together with similarity, as they are all 
involved in the knowledge process. One of the consequences is that the 
separation of metaphors from everyday language becomes impossible, and it is 
worth mentioning that Mac Cormac places the so-called dead metaphors within 
ordinary language. 
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We would only say that ‘dead metaphors’ (which are nevertheless alive by 
constant usage, cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980) create a fuzzy category in-between 
figurative and literal language, of course, if we accept this rather controversial 
dichotomy. 
Another problematic aspect (under the controversion theory) is that 
metaphors are meaningful, but false. This falsity comes from semantic 
contradiction and not from empirical test (folk theory gladly passes them) and, 
interestingly enough, Mac Cormac offers an approach of degrees. He discusses 
the relativism of metaphors, and observes that they could be false when taken 
literally and true when taken figuratively. Hence the truth or falsity of the 
metaphor is relative to its context of interpretation, as there is a degree to which 
their referents have similar properties and false to the degree that their referents 
have dissimilar properties. His fuzzy-set theory (1985:216, 220) is consistent 
with it, so we have F (false), D (diaphor), E (epiphor), T (truth). In his view, we 
have epiphors (metaphors that express more than suggest) and diaphors 
(metaphors that suggest more than they express). Diaphors can become epiphors 
as their hypothetical suggestions find confirmation in experience/experiment, so 
they turn commonplace. 
Although this seems plausible, we cannot really accept his argument, as the 
case of ‘dead’ metaphors remains unsolved. Remember that on the one hand we 
have metaphors we live by (Lakoff), on the other hand we have dead metaphors. 
Stylistically Mac Cormac is right, but cognitive grammar deals with 
understanding, motivation, nature and origin; the way Lakoff presents them 
offers an explanation to these. Dictionaries contain dead metaphors (Mac 
Cormac), but when reading a dictionary, one can often find explanatory remarks, 
such as (fig.), standing for figurative, which Mac Cormac omits to mention. So it 
seems plausible to us when Mac Cormac criticizes Lakoff & Johnson (1985:58-
60), saying that they are adamant when it comes to the status of metaphors: even 
when figurative metaphors become conventional or literal metaphors, they retain 
their metaphorical status (otherwise dictionaries could not have identified them 
as metaphors!). 
By considering hundreds of dead metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson succeeded 
in showing that natural language presumes and expresses many hidden conceptual 
meanings arising from the use of these metaphors. But they transformed these 
dead metaphors into live ones by redefining the notion of dead metaphors. For 
them, metaphors are alive because they are used in ordinary language as parts of 
the systematic metaphoric expression. So they have no method left for 
distinguishing between metaphoric and non-metaphoric utterances, they have 
literal metaphors and figurative metaphors. Moran correctly observes that the 
meaning of the metaphor in general will be confined to the intentions of the 
speaker if the meaning of a metaphorical utterance is the speaker’s meaning, and 
the latter is a function of the intentions of the speaker in making the utterance. 
Thus the interpretation of the metaphor will be a matter of the recovery of the 
intentions of the speaker (1997:264). If Moran is right, the so-called ‘live’ 
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metaphors can be difficult to interpret, as the interpreter is dependent on 
assumptions about the beliefs and intentions of the speaker (Cooper 1986:73, cited 
by Moran 1997). 
We can only say that once categorising is accepted, there is a degree of 
membership, including views upon language itself. So Lakoff and Johnson can 
only embed non-metaphorical concepts in direct experience, which emerges 
through interaction of the agent with their environment. Kövecses indirectly 
answers the question of ‘dead’ metaphors later (2002, Preface): 
…dictionary entries are full of that, but there is an important point: 
they are deeply entrenched, hardly noticed and thus effortlessly used, 
they are most active in our thought. So they are ‘alive’. According to 
the cognitive approach, both metaphorical language and thought rise 
from the basic bodily (sensori-motor) experience of human beings, and 
it is a key instrument in organizing human thought. 
Conclusions 
Metaphors bring about changes in the ways in which we perceive the world, and 
these conceptual changes often bring about changes in the ways in which we act 
in the world, accepts Mac Cormac (1985:149). Metaphors appear to be so 
common and so regular a part of ordinary language that instead of contending 
that they deviate from a normative grammar, it is worth considering that any 
grammar, which cannot account for metaphor, is too limited in comprehension to 
be useful (Mac Cormac 1985:32). On analysing the relationship between 
metaphor and communication, Moran concludes: 
...metaphorical speech counts as genuinely communicative (of a 
content beyond the literal) because, among other things, the figurative 
interpretation of the utterance is guided by assumptions about the 
beliefs and intentions of the speaker, intentions which, among other 
things satisfy the Gricean (1975) formula (1997:261). 
The success of metaphor in communication may also be explained by the fact 
that metaphor is beyond language, as it is to be found primarily in thought and 
action (e.g. killing wax dolls, Lakoff and Johnson 1980:153). The danger of 
pervasiveness of metaphor lies in the fact that there are many ways of creating it: 
extending, elaborating, questioning, combining and personification (Kövecses 
2002:47-50). Metaphors produce new insights and new hypotheses internally, 
whereas externally they act as mediators between the human mind and culture, 
states Mac Cormac (1985:2). This correlates with Moran’s statement (1997:252), 
according to which the words employed in a metaphor undergo a ‘meaning-
shift’, but when an expression is interpreted metaphorically, the literal one is not 
cancelled or removed from consideration. The constraint that limits the 
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excessive production of metaphors is that there must be a similarity between the 
two entities compared. In Moran’s words: 
In metaphor...if we are to speak of a new meaning, this meaning will 
be something reachable only through comprehension of the previously 
established, literal meanings of the particular words that make it up 
(1997:253). 
Davidson, on the other hand, denies the non-literal meaning regarding 
metaphors. His famous statement attracted serious criticism: “... metaphors mean 
what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more” 
(1979:246). 
Cognitive linguistics breaks away from the notion of predictability of 
generative grammar, and replaces this notion with motivation. Our remark is that 
when we have a metaphorical view, we employ only a part of a source domain, 
not the whole (when needed), in other cases other parts. The mappings that 
deviate from the widely accepted ones are either considered as bad ones, or 
literal ones! This partial mapping (only a part of a concept is mapped, and only a 
part of target is involved) peaks in metaphorical highlighting (Kövecses 
2002:67, 75, 79), and the unconventional use is called ‘unutilized parts of the 
source’ (e.g. the chimney of a building). 
Moreover, many metaphors do map additional knowledge from the source 
onto the target, and one can pick out distinct pieces of knowledge associated 
with the source domain of a metaphor, which is already connected to the scope 
of a metaphor. This means that abstract concepts are characterized by a large 
number of distinct source domains, and a single concept can characterize many 
distinct target domains (war is both argument and love, cf. Kövecses 2002:94, 
107). The previously mentioned motivation comes into picture again, as truth 
value is connected to motivation (purpose in mind when dealing with categories, 
fuzzy sets), which ultimately helps in successful communication to be realized 
by well-established meaning foci of words (cf. Kövecses 2002). The conclusion 
is that Plato’s and Aristotle’s objectivism and subjectivism are only myths (cf. 
cave and “the greatest thing by far is to be a master of the metaphor”, Poetics, 
1459a). Lakoff and Johnson conclude that metaphor unites reason and 
imagination, creating an imaginative reality (although ‘virtual reality’ is a 
contradiction in terms, nobody seems to care too much about it, and we all seem 
to perfectly understand and use the expression). 
All in all, we can say that metaphors indeed give an insight into everyday 
experience; the way we have been brought up to perceive our world is not the 
only way and it is impossible to see beyond the “truths” of one’s particular 
culture (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:239). These metaphors, after all, contribute to 
the differences between humans and animals by the systematicity of analogies 
and disanalogies. Even the unknown is felt closer this way, and major advances 
in metaphor theory preserve these findings (cf. Joseph Grady’s complex 
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metaphors, Srinivas Narayanan’s metaphors as neural phenomenon. And the 
subject is not closed, as Mac Cormac’s (1985:56) statement leaves the question 
open: “not all language is metaphorical, only the theories about metaphors are 
metaphorical”.  
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